Pentecostalism and the Morality of Money:Prosperity, Inequality, and Religious Sociality on the Zambian Copperbelt by Haynes, Naomi
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pentecostalism and the Morality of Money
Citation for published version:
Haynes, N 2012, 'Pentecostalism and the Morality of Money: Prosperity, Inequality, and Religious Sociality
on the Zambian Copperbelt' Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, vol 18, no. 1, pp. 123-139. DOI:
10.1111/j.1467-9655.2011.01734.x
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1111/j.1467-9655.2011.01734.x
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Early version, also known as pre-print
Published In:
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: © Haynes, N. (2012). Pentecostalism and the
Morality of Money: Prosperity, Inequality, and Religious Sociality on the Zambian Copperbelt. Journal of the
Royal Anthropological Institute, 18(1), 123-139, which has been published in final form at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9655.2011.01734.x
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 28. Apr. 2017
1 
Pentecostalism and the Morality of Money: 
Prosperity, Inequality, and Religious Sociality on the Zambian Copperbelt 
 
Naomi Haynes 
Doctoral Candidate 
Department of Anthropology 
University of California, San Diego 
9500 Gilman Drive 
La Jolla, CA 92093-0532 
Email: nhaynes@ucsd.edu 
 
Abstract: 
As part of a growing body of work focused on the social implications of 
Pentecostal Christianity, this paper explores one of the ways that this religion is 
shaping relational life on the Zambian Copperbelt.  Through a discussion of the 
changing nature of the prosperity gospel, I show how Pentecostalism embeds 
believers in social relationships that often extend beyond their religious cohort.  
In the absence of the lavish wealth promised by prosperity gospel preachers, 
Pentecostals have had to alter their understanding of divinely authored 
economic success.  Specifically, local definitions of prosperity are characterized 
not by uniform, individualized wealth, but rather by progress along a gradient 
of material achievement through relationships that span differences in 
economic status.  This retooled version of the prosperity gospel serves to 
integrate believers into the wider social world by emphasizing material 
inequality and promoting displays of wealth.  Each of these aspects of 
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Copperbelt Pentecostalism embeds its adherents in networks of exchange that 
are a central component of urban Zambian sociality.  This analysis of 
Pentecostalism expands on studies of this religion that focus only on formal 
ritual life, while at the same time challenging interpretations of Pentecostalism 
that have given its social potential short shrift.   
 
 
 
It appears that we are witnessing a turn in the anthropological study of Pentecostal 
Christianity, a turn towards a more robust analysis of the social, political, and economic 
aspects of this religion (e.g. Robbins 2009a, van Dijk 2009, Bailecki 2009; see also Marshall 
2009).  This development is both welcome and necessary: while anyone wishing to 
understand the ritual life of Pentecostals has had an ever-expanding ethnographic corpus on 
which to draw, analyses of this religion beyond the space of the church have been 
comparatively few.  In making this claim I do not mean to imply that compelling arguments 
about the relationship between Pentecostalism and, for example, political economy have not 
been made.  Indeed, much has been said about the meteoric rise of this form of Christianity 
alongside the expansion of neoliberal reforms throughout the Global South.  At issue, then, is 
not an absence of possible connections between Pentecostalism and its wider contexts, but 
rather a lack of detailed ethnographic engagement with the lives of local believers as they 
unfold outside of the church.  Only recently has the situation begun to change, and efforts 
towards an analysis of Pentecostal sociality represent an important step in the study of one of 
the fastest-growing religions in the world. 
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In this paper I offer an ethnographic examination of Pentecostal material and social life in the 
kind of community where this form of Christianity typically flourishes – a densely populated 
urban neighborhood in the heart of an extraction economy.  My analysis is informed by 
twenty months of fieldwork on the Zambian Copperbelt, most of it in a township that I call 
Nsofu.i  I argue that the particular approach to economic inequality and emphasis on material 
consumption that together characterize Copperbelt Pentecostalism work to foster social 
relationships both within and beyond the boundaries of this religion.  By showing how this is 
the case, my aim is to make a small contribution to a larger understanding of what kinds of 
social ties (Engelke 2010), value structures (Robbins 2009b), or economic options (Guyer 
2007) are created and foreclosed by conversion to this form of Christianity. 
 
Through a discussion of the changing character of the Pentecostal prosperity gospel on the 
Copperbelt, I show the capacity of this religion to create interpersonal relationships within a 
larger social world organized by a material hierarchy.  After outlining some of the particular, 
local characteristics of Pentecostalism, I turn my attention first to the various ways in which 
Nsofu believers describe divinely authored prosperity in terms of staggered progress along 
an economic gradient.  I then address the social import of material inequality in the wider 
context of urban Zambia, where economic ambition is part of a larger cultural framework of 
exchange among households of different financial means.  Having demonstrated that 
economic hierarchy is central to interpersonal life in Nsofu, I conclude by illustrating how 
Pentecostals not only understand the material aspects of their religious life in relationally 
meaningful terms, but also pursue religiously motivated forms of consumption that facilitate 
the development of material exchange and enduring social ties.  Before showing how this is 
the case, however, it is worthwhile to highlight some of the ways that anthropologists have 
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approached Pentecostal Christianity, the late-capitalist economy, and the social implications 
of their intersection. 
 
Pentecostal Ethics, Neoliberal Spirits 
 
Pentecostalism is a form of Christianity oriented toward the immediate experience of the 
Holy Spirit, usually through practices such as glossolalia and prophecy (Dayton 1987: 15-33).  
Over the past several decades Pentecostalism has grown exponentially around the world 
(Robbins 2004), and sub-Saharan Africa has been a primary site of this expansion (Meyer 
2004b).  Central to anthropological discussions of this religion has been the prosperity 
gospel, a theological sub-strain within Pentecostalism that has enjoyed success in numerous 
churches.  Also known as the ‘faith gospel’ or ‘health and wealth gospel,’ its message is that it 
is God’s will for believers to be rich, healthy, and successful (Coleman 2000, Ukah 2005).  
Typically, proponents of this teaching ask believers to contribute money or goods in kind to 
the church; these gifts, usually referred to as ‘seeds,’ are understood to carry the promise of a 
divinely increased ‘harvest’ (e.g. de Boeck 2004: 198).  Through such offerings, believers 
work to integrate themselves into a heavenly economy of superabundance (Hasu 2006, 
Wiegele 2005). 
 
For many analysts, the widespread popularity of the prosperity gospel in the structurally 
adjusted Global South can be attributed to the increasingly inscrutable inner workings of late 
capitalism.  Central to this interpretation has been Comaroff and Comaroff’s work on ‘occult 
economies’ (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999, 2000), which situates the prosperity gospel 
alongside witchcraft accusations, rumors of zombies, and lurid tales of Faustian pacts with 
the Devil.  Through these discursive tools the disenfranchised youth of post-revolutionary 
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and post-colonial societies both ascribe supernatural origins to the seemingly spectral wealth 
of the neoliberal economy and attempt to access that same wealth through supernatural 
means of their own.  In the prosperity gospel, Comaroff and Comaroff argue, ‘Pentecostalism 
meets neoliberal enterprise’ (2000: 314) as adherents to this religion pursue wealth that, 
while visible everywhere, consistently eludes them.  
 
While many aspects of the occult economies argument are compelling, it is a mistake to read 
the prosperity gospel as simply a spectral parallel of the market, a phantasmagoric shadow of 
a structurally adjusted reality.  When religion figures only as a super-structural 
epiphenomenon moving over the solid base of capitalist hegemony, the possibility that 
Pentecostalism might be a productive space with real-world consequences, ‘a site of action, 
invested in and appropriated by believers’ (Marshall 2009: 22), is foreclosed out of hand.  
What is missing here is any serious consideration of the idea that the kind of processes Weber 
attributed to modern Calvinist theology and practice – much less any kind of intentional 
social engagement (cf. Miller and Yamamori 2007) – might be evident in late-modern 
Pentecostalism.  
 
In contrast to the occult economies approach to Pentecostal Christianity, several recent 
discussions of have illustrated the possible ways in which this religion might be socially or 
economically productive.  Among these is Marshall’s (2009) important study of Nigerian 
Pentecostalism, which employs a Foucaultian analysis of religious techniques of the self to 
highlight believers’ program of social and political change.  Using a very different theoretical 
approach, Robbins (2009a) suggests that one of the primary reasons for Pentecostal 
expansion among those most disenfranchised by late capitalism may very well be the ease 
with which this religion creates social cohesion despite the ‘institutional deficit’ of the 
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neoliberal global order (B. Martin 1998: 117-18, after Lash and Urry 1994).  Because the 
various ritual practices of Pentecostalism are understood to be available to everyone and 
capable of being implemented everywhere, Robbins argues, they create and draw people into 
social groups with special alacrity.   
 
Both Marshall’s and Robbins’ studies highlight the possibility that Pentecostalism might 
produce novel social and political relationships.  Van Dijk (2009) makes a related argument in 
his recent discussion of Ghanaian Pentecostal migrants to Gaborone, which illustrates how 
this religion works to further integrate its adherents into existing social or economic 
frameworks.  Van Dijk demonstrates that, rather than creating a parallel economy that merely 
echoes the structures of capitalism, Pentecostal churches ‘catapult’ migrants toward ‘a 
modern engagement with the market on its own terms’ (2009: 111).  Prosperity preaching, 
insofar as it is part of the theological program of these congregations, is characterized not by 
injunctions to give seed offerings, but by instruction in entrepreneurship.  It is this same 
emphasis on personal efforts towards prosperity that leads Berger (2008) to refer, perhaps 
infelicitously, to followers of the prosperity gospel as ‘intentional Weberians,’ whose 
confidence in the promise of divine wealth pushes them into the marketplace.   
 
As these examples illustrate, when studying the relationship between Pentecostalism and 
economy the possibility that religious life might result in novel relational forms or the 
integration of believers in extant modes of social or economic organization must be taken into 
account.  With this potential in mind, we turn our attention to Pentecostalism on the Zambian 
Copperbelt. 
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Nsofu Pentecostals and the Changing Face of the Prosperity Gospel 
 
Today, just over a century after the arrival of the first western missionaries in Zambia, the 
presence of Christianity on the Copperbelt is inescapable (see Taylor and Lehmann 1961, van 
Binsbergen 1981).  Missionary-established Christian denominations, including Anglican, 
Catholic, and Seventh Day Adventist churches, are an important part of the local religious 
landscape.  In 1991, as the country was transitioning to multi-party democracy, the Zambian 
government made a constitutional declaration that it would be a ‘Christian nation.’ii  Within 
this wider religious context, Pentecostals account for a significant portion of the Christian 
population (Agha et al. 2006: 552-553), and the influence of Pentecostalism is evident on 
several fronts.  For example, religious practice in non-Pentecostal churches has become 
increasingly ‘Pentecostalized’ as this newer form of Christianity has made inroads into the 
missionary-established denominations (Cheyeka 2006).  In addition, the broader popular 
culture reflects the extent of the Pentecostal reach in Zambia: leaving Nsofu one is likely to 
board a bus emblazoned with a phrase like ‘Holy Spirit Power’ and spend the twenty-minute 
trip into town listening to a stream of popular songs denouncing Satan and claiming divine 
healing (cf. Meyer 2004a). 
 
Copperbelt Pentecostals are sometimes part of transnational denominations, including the 
Pentecostal Assemblies of God (see Maxwell 2006 for a study of this denomination in 
Zimbabwe).  However, my fieldwork was focused not on these large, centralized groups, but 
rather the independent, locally founded congregations that represent the most common type 
of Pentecostal congregation on the Copperbelt.  I chose three such churches for extended 
participant observation, though over the course of my fieldwork I visited scores of similar 
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gatherings.  The fact that there were so many churches to be visited is itself indicative of the 
wide reach of Pentecostalism in Nsofu.  This community of about 25,000 people is home to 
many dozens of Pentecostal churches and fellowships, most of which were less than ten years 
old, boasted fewer than 100 members, and met either in private homes or rented classrooms 
in the government primary school.   
 
In Nsofu’s many Pentecostal churches the influence of the prosperity gospel was clear.  
Leaders and laity alike expressed confidence that it was God’s will for them to experience 
‘prosperity,’ a term usually used in Englishiii that they connected not only to economic 
advancement, but also to physical health, strong family ties, and spiritual development.  One 
of the hallmarks of this approach to Christianity on the Copperbelt is the belief that divinely 
authored prosperity is an index of personal salvation, and individual markers of the former – 
whether a marriage, good health, or a new upholstered chair – are therefore imbued with 
apologetic and evangelistic value.   
 
Despite this commitment to a Pentecostal idea of progress, however, I found that the 
prosperity gospel in Nsofu had in many ways been altered from its paradigmatic form.  This 
was in part because a number of local Pentecostals had fallen prey to what they identified as 
‘false prophets:’ itinerate preachers who demanded material seeds in exchange for the 
promise of divine blessings and who, in the eyes of believers, were ultimately revealed to be 
charlatans, Satanists, or sinners.  Beyond these negative experiences, Copperbelt Pentecostals 
have also had to face the fact that, despite their faithful religious adherence, the riches of the 
prosperity gospel regularly elude them.  The erratic mining economy on which many depend 
for their livelihoods ensured that few of my informants had access to the tailored suits, luxury 
cars, or cutting-edge electronics often associated with Pentecostal preaching.  
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In the absence of lavish wealth and in the light of their experiences with false prophets, 
Copperbelt believers have reconfigured the prosperity gospel through a local process of 
nuancing and critique paralleled in other contexts (cf. Maxwell 1998: 366).  The trademark 
prosperity practice of sowing monetary seeds, for instance, was carefully circumscribed in 
Nsofu, and the give-to-get message that figures prominently in the ethnographic literature on 
Pentecostalism had also been dialed down.  Nsofu believers have expanded the definition of 
prosperity to include intangible blessings; qualified it with caveats about the speed with 
which blessing can be expected (cf. Lindhardt 2009); and, as we will see, staggered their 
expectations of prosperity along a continuum of material advancement.   
 
This retooling of the prosperity message makes it inappropriate to describe Copperbelt 
Pentecostals as followers of the prosperity gospel.  Instead, I would argue that because 
believers maintain that it is God’s will for them to prosper, while at the same time 
participating in a theological project aimed at defining and delimiting this belief, Nsofu 
Pentecostals are best characterized as adherents to what is at best a limited prosperity 
gospel.  While this distinction might seem like an unnecessary exercise in ethnographic hair-
splitting, the fact that this kind of Pentecostalism is being transformed into something 
different on the Copperbelt is important because it addresses a central question in the study 
of the prosperity gospel: What happens when prosperity fails?  How, as Meyer (2004b: 460) 
puts it, has this teaching avoided being ‘subverted by its own appeal’ in the absence of the 
lavish wealth promised by its proponents? (see also D. Martin 1990: 232). 
 
By using a discussion of Nsofu Pentecostalism to explore this issue, my aim is to 
simultaneously address another, namely, the question of Pentecostal sociality that is at the 
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heart of this paper.  The way that Nsofu Pentecostals respond to the incompatibility of their 
economic experience with the belief that God has promised them abundant wealth sheds 
some light on how the prosperity gospel continues to influence believers even after it 
becomes apparent that they are not receiving the riches they have been promised.  More 
importantly, by redefining prosperity in the face of the current economic reality of the 
Copperbelt, believers provide us with clues as to how their religious and material lives come 
together in ways that might foster social relationships.  As we will see, this is closely tied to 
the question of economic differentiation.   
 
The Equality of Penury; The Prosperity of Difference 
 
When I first visited Freedom Bible Church early in 2008 I was lucky to get a seat.  The church 
had been in existence for several years when I arrived, and by all accounts I found it at its 
peak.  Even from far up the street one could hear the singing from the crowd gathered in the 
small classroom where the congregation met every Sunday morning.  More than seventy 
adults crammed into the narrow school desks to listen to the charismatic preaching of the 
several young pastors who led the group.  Adolescent women danced, mothers with babies on 
their backs threw up their hands in ecstatic prayer, and men in collars and ties balanced 
heavy Bibles across their laps, following the text during the sermon.  More and more people 
came each week and there was talk of raising enough money to secure a plot for a church 
building, the great dream of every tiny Pentecostal congregation.   
 
Given this forward momentum, I was surprised to find the schoolroom nearly empty when I 
arrived at Freedom for a regular Sunday morning service in May 2008.  While the order of 
service went ahead as usual, moving from prayer, to singing, to a sermon, it was clear from 
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the outset that something was not right.  Mr. Moyo, a prominent member of the congregation, 
began the meeting by assuring the few who had gathered that the church leadership was 
aware that people had been offended by a visiting pastor who had preached the previous 
Sunday, and that they were taking care to address the problem.  He then went on to deliver an 
extemporaneous exhortation in which he reminded everyone that they were ‘successful’ 
regardless of how much money they made.  Circumstances didn’t dictate success, he 
continued, and there was nothing wrong with living in a certain place or wearing certain 
things.  He stated that he often wore salaula (second-hand clothes) and saw no problem with 
that – in fact, Mr. Moyo noted, by buying second-hand clothes one might be answering the 
prayer of those who sell them.  Before asking the song leaders to come forward, Mr. Moyo 
made it a point to note that the prosperity gospel would ruin believers if they were not 
careful, as it could easily convince them that success was an overnight affair, rather than a 
long and slow process. 
 
Later in the week, I called on my friends Bana Junioriv and Bana Precious, both regular 
Freedom attendees, who helped me understand exactly what had made the message of the 
visiting pastor so troublesome.  Even before delivering his sermon, Bana Precious explained, 
the preacher had made it clear that he didn’t think that people in the church had experienced 
prosperity.  The pulpit that the congregation brought to the classroom every week was rather 
rickety, and when the visiting pastor got up to speak he made a point to say that he hadn’t 
expected to be preaching from something of such poor quality; when he returned to the 
church at a later date, he added, he expected to find a new podium.  He then continued his 
message in the same vein, telling the group that they weren’t living in prosperity.  Christians 
shouldn’t eat beans and vegetables, the pastor stated, but rather sausage and chicken.  Nor 
should they wear salaula, but only new garments.  In other words, Bana Junior explained, the 
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preacher said that Christians should always be those who lived at the top of society, spending 
their money on luxury goods and food rather than having to budget.  
 
Let me pause at this point to say that both Bana Junior and Bana Precious, along with 
everyone else I knew who attended Freedom Bible Church, held a common commitment to 
the idea that God wanted them to have material success.  After Mr. Moyo delivered his 
scathing indictment of the prosperity gospel, Pastor Ephraim, the leader of Freedom Bible 
Church, gave a sermon focused on the importance of wakefulness, which he defined in terms 
of wisdom and industriousness.  These latter character traits, Pastor Ephraim stated, would 
allow people to experience prosperity. 
 
The negative response to the visiting preacher was therefore not a commentary on the idea 
that Pentecostals ought to be moving forward.  Rather, what people were reacting to was the 
assertion that all Christians ought to have arrived at the same point in their experience of 
divine success – that is, that all believers ought to be equally prosperous.  As Bana Junior went 
on to explain to me, this was simply not the way things worked.  ‘Did God mean for all people 
to be the same?’ she asked when I inquired about the sermon.  Without missing a beat, Bana 
Junior answered her own question, arguing that the point of Christianity was not for 
everyone to be like everyone else.  God made everyone to be different.  For Bana Junior, this 
was not a question of individual self-realization as much as economic diversity.  There were 
some who had a lot and some who had a little, she explained to me, and this did not mean that 
they weren’t Christians.  Rather, they were all still growing – ‘Does a baby know everything 
when it’s born?’ 
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This same rejection of uniform economic prosperity is evident in Mr. Moyo’s denouncement 
of the visiting preacher’s message.  For Mr. Moyo, Christian success did not mean material 
equality.  Indeed, as he pointed out, it is through economic difference that prosperity might be 
extended to others, as when one person buys second-hand clothing from a vendor in the 
market and contributes to the latter’s wellbeing by patronizing her business.  While the 
message of Nsofu Pentecostalism is certainly that believers ought to experience some sort of 
divinely ordained material progress, it is clear that in the local definition of prosperity the 
end result is not uniform success, but rather staggered advancement along an economic 
gradient.  Just as economic inequality appears important to Copperbelt Pentecostal ideas of 
prosperity, material hierarchy is also central to local visions of national salvation.   
 
Zambia Shall Be Saved! 
 
The constitutional declaration that Zambia would be a ‘Christian nation’ is a frequent topic of 
public discussion among Pentecostals and other Christians from missionary-established 
denominations.  While church leaders frequently debate exactly what it means for Zambia to 
be a Christian nation, Pentecostals routinely invoke ‘the declaration’ as a sort of promissory 
note for national salvation and, by proxy, prosperity.  The frequency with which this idea was 
articulated during my fieldwork increased dramatically during the protracted illness and 
eventual death of President Mwanawasa in July and August of 2008.   
 
On the Sunday after the official announcement that the president had passed away I attended 
the worship service at Key of David Church, another Nsofu Pentecostal congregation.  That 
day the group’s leader, Pastor Mwanza, delivered a sermon focused not only on the late 
president’s many achievements, but also on the future of Zambia.  I recorded this sermon and 
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later in the week invited Bana Sam and Bana Charles to review excerpts of the message and 
discuss its content.  Both women are Pentecostals and members of Key of David Church.  Near 
the end of our conversation we turned our attention to Pastor Mwanza’s treatment of the 
‘destiny’ of Zambia, which he had preached was ‘assured’ despite the unexpected death of the 
president.  
 
NH: If I asked you, what is the destiny of Zambia, what do you think?  What is  
the destiny of Zambia?  Yesterday… someone said that Zambia  
has now become like Israel.  He said we will be the Israel of Africa, like 
the chosen of Africa. 
BS: It’s true they declared that “Zambia is a Christian nation.”  And “Zambia  
shall be saved.”  In many things.  That is what we have in mind.  One day 
there will be no more hunger in Zambia.   
BC: Yeah 
BS: One day many people will work, they will be employed.  That’s what I  
think of these things.  There will not be so much suffering.  And many 
people will know God.  And there will be fewer taverns. 
BC: And more churches 
………………………………… 
BS: …The children of Israel when they went to the Promised Land, that was a  
land which was flowing milk and honey.  So if we are saved we know 
God, meaning we will start working at good jobs, we will eat and be 
satisfied, we will worship God, if you’re praying in church there won’t be 
worries about what we will eat the next day…  That’s the way I see it.  
Free mind.  You can walk away having left your clothes [on the 
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clothesline] and no one will take them.  People only know God.  They are 
not lacking anything. 
 
In this conversation, Bana Sam begins by weaving together the constitutional declaration of 
Zambia as a Christian nation with the slogan ‘Zambia shall be saved,’ made popular by 
erstwhile vice president and Pentecostal televangelist Nevers Mumba, who currently serves 
as the Zambian ambassador to Canada.  In so doing she elides the present and future tenses to 
paint a picture of what she imagines a fully formed Christian country will look like.  Because 
of Bana Sam’s commitment to Pentecostal notions of prosperity, these spiritual shifts are 
necessarily evidenced by material transformation: when Zambia is truly saved, people will 
not only worship God, but will enjoy steady employment and abundant food.  As our 
conversation continued, however, it became clear that the vision these believers had of 
national salvation and prosperity was not characterized by uniform wealth, but rather by 
economic and spiritual differentiation.   
 
NH: …Would you say that that’s the destiny of Zambia, eventually people will  
all be saved, they will know God – 
BS: It’s not everyone, Ba Naomi!…  Not everyone will be saved.   
BC: Not everyone  
BS: But many people 
…………… 
NH: Even, even if Zambia as a nation, in the future, it becomes part of that  
thing there will still be those who are not part of the same salvation?…  
Even if it’s the destiny for the whole nation, even if we say the whole 
nation is going forward, there will still be some who will not [go]? 
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BC: Yes 
BS: Yes, but it should be a small number… 
BC: Yes, very small… 
BS: It can’t be like this [like it is now] 
BC: And then those who are poor, those who are dead last, I think, that  
number should also be reduced.  There should only be a few of them, 
such that, maybe those in church will be able to help, you have the 
means to help them.  Not like now, you look here, you look here, you 
look here –  
BS: Everywhere something needs to be done 
 
Bana Sam and Bana Charles’ correction of my interpretation of their vision of Zambia’s 
destiny is partly theological: not everyone will be saved.  This doctrinal tenet of 
Pentecostalism is well documented throughout Africa and elsewhere in, for example, the way 
this religion relentlessly divides the world into binaries of good and evil, saved and damned 
(Meyer 1999).  A Pentecostal song, popular during my fieldwork, quoted Jesus’ admonition 
that not all those who call him Lord will enter the kingdom of heaven,v ensuring that this 
particular text was rooted in the minds of anyone who spent time in the market or public 
buses where the song was regularly played on the radio.   
 
However, this vision of the future – that is, the kind of social world that both women imagine 
as the logical outgrowth of the Pentecostal salvation in Zambia – is limited in scope for 
reasons that I believe extend beyond these theological issues.  Bana Sam and Bana Charles 
made it clear that economic differentiation is a central component of prosperity as they 
define and envision it.  In this way, their understanding of divinely authored material 
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advancement parallels that communicated by believers at Freedom Bible Church, who 
rejected the notion that prosperity meant uniform success.  According to Bana Sam and Bana 
Charles, a country that is truly saved is not one in which everyone is rich, but one in which 
those who are have enough and are numerous enough to become benefactors of those who 
aren’t.  Put differently, the prosperity that these Pentecostals believed would follow national 
salvation was marked by relationships of inequality capable of facilitating material progress.  
This commitment to advancement through an interdependent material hierarchy turns our 
attention back to the issue of Pentecostal sociality.  If the type of social world that believers 
understand to be an outgrowth of prosperity is one marked not only by progress, but also by 
difference, how does this vision relate to the wider context of Nsofu?  In order to respond to 
this question, we must turn our attention to the role of inequality the political economy of the 
Copperbelt. 
 
On the Social Productivity of Material Inequality 
 
The rutted dirt roads of Nsofu are lined with a collection of privatized company houses, 
vacant lots piled with bricks, completed homes ringed with cinderblock walls, and other 
houses in various stages of construction.  Some of the homes are occupied by their owners, 
who may be pensioners or workers at the mine; other houses are shared by families working 
on their construction; still others are rented to wage laborers.  As this residential pattern 
suggests, Nsofu is a neighborhood marked by economic diversity (cf. Hansen 1997: 156-158).  
Widows who subsist largely on the charity of others, contract workers at the mine whose 
monthly salary is scarcely enough to pay the rent in a small ‘cabin’ in Nsofuvi, teachers in 
public or private schools, and civil servants all live next door to each other.vii  
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In Nsofu I lived in the home of Pastor Mwanza and his wife, who was a teacher at a private 
primary school in addition to being the assistant pastor at Key of David Church.  Also in the 
household were Mrs. Mwanza’s teenaged daughter, Musonda, and a man named Moses, who 
was a deacon at Key of David and had lived with the Mwanzas for nearly a year when I 
arrived in their home.  It wasn’t long before I became acquainted with the family’s friends and 
neighbors.  I noticed early on that the Mwanza family had one or two other families with 
which they frequently interacted and were quite close.  In particular, I came to expect that 
nearly every day we would receive a visit from a member of Bana Ilunga’s family.   
 
Bana Ilunga and her husband and five children lived just down the street from the Mwanzas, 
where they rented a few rooms in an unfinished house that was not connected to basic 
services.  Although Bana Ilunga’s husband was employed at a local NGO, like many people on 
the Copperbelt he would routinely go months without being paid.  Even when he did receive 
his salary on time it was often inadequate to cover the family’s expenses.  The Mwanza family, 
by comparison, was in a more stable financial situation.  The difference in economic status 
between the two families was seen not only in the asymmetry of their visible assets, but also 
in the pattern of exchange that characterized their relationship.  Gifts of food or cash flowed 
from the Mwanza family to the members of Bana Ilunga’s family, who reciprocated in largely 
intangible ways, primarily labor.  For example, one of Bana Ilunga’s daughters would plait 
Mrs. Mwanza’s hair; another would sweep the house if Musonda was away.  In return, Bana 
Ilunga helped herself to the cassava leaves growing in the Mwanza’s back yard, kept food in 
the family’s deep freezer, and every few days received a bit of cooking oil, curry powder, or 
soap.  
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As time went on it became apparent that the pattern of exchange I observed between the 
Mwanza family and Bana Ilunga’s family was in no way unique.  During my fieldwork I 
conducted two rounds of domestic consumption surveys, which helped to refine my 
observations about the material life of homes in which I was not living.  Over the course of 
one week participants kept a record of everything that went into and out of their house – that 
is, everything they bought and sold, gave and received.  Because they were asked to provide 
information about their monthly incomes, and because all participants were people known to 
me, it became clear that inter-household exchanges most readily occurred between families 
of unequal economic status.  Follow-up interviews and subsequent participant observation 
revealed that these kinds of exchanges usually resulted in enduring social relationships.  
Ultimately, I came to the conclusion that in Nsofu social ties most frequently formed between 
people or households of unequal economic status and crystallized in a pattern of exchange 
that further underscored the difference between the two parties (cf. Hansen 1985).viii 
 
In Nsofu, then, exchange relationships typically follow material inequality and are occasioned, 
at least in part, by the socioeconomic diversity of the township (Sahlins 1972: 210-215).  
Here it is important to point out that exchanges like those described above are not examples 
of sharing, much less attempts to level the economic playing field (Guyer 2004: 147).  None of 
my informants ever spoke of their actions in these terms.  Instead, in Nsofu the social ties 
developed through exchanges between individuals or households of unequal means are best 
understood as so many instances of two primary Copperbelt relational values: ambition and 
obligation.  Here, bonds that connect one family to another of higher status constitute a 
means of social mobility, while ties to a household of lower status allow people to fulfill some 
of the responsibilities of their position by responding to others’ material needs.ix  This 
framework of relational values and economic exchanges, while clearly providing for 
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everyone’s potential progress, is dependent upon – and continually reproduces – economic 
difference.   
 
Space does not permit me to describe Copperbelt social ties, or the exchanges that 
characterize them, in the detail they deserve.  However, even this brief discussion reveals the 
importance of economic inequality to relational and material life in Nsofu.  It is in this context 
that we are able to address one way Pentecostalism might facilitate social relationships on 
the Copperbelt.  As we have seen, believers’ visions of prosperity are expressed not in terms 
of universal wealth, but rather in relationships that span a graded continuum of progress.  
This emphasis on relationally and economically productive material hierarchy is evident not 
only in Pentecostal preaching and imagination, but in practice as well.  As one final example 
will illustrate, for Nsofu believers the purchase and display of consumer goods represents a 
key point at which adherence to Pentecostalism, and to the locally redefined prosperity 
gospel, becomes socially productive.    
 
Pots, a Power Outage, and a Pentecostal Pastor’s Wife 
 
During my fieldwork, Nsofu was routinely without electricity as part of a national load-
shedding program.  On one such darkened evening I sat together with Pastor Mwanza, 
Musonda, and Moses and debated whether or not to buy charcoal so that we could start 
cooking dinner on the brazier.  Eventually we decided to wait for the electricity to come back 
rather than spend the necessary K2,000.  Besides, there wasn’t much in the house to cook.  
Musonda thought that perhaps her mother would return with groceries, since she was so long 
in coming home.  Indeed, Mrs. Mwanza was particularly late in returning from work, and all of 
us wondered what could be keeping her.  
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Finally, we heard the unmistakable creak of the heavy black gate that divided the fenced-in 
front yard from the street.  Moments later Mrs. Mwanza burst into the kitchen, weighed down 
by several plastic bags that she set down with a heavy thud, sending the candle on the table 
sputtering.  Still breathless from the walk back from the bus station, Mrs. Mwanza began 
unpacking her various parcels, pulling tomatoes, onions, and greens from her sacks.  The 
lumpy bulk of another bundle suggested dried beans.  From inside of a large, blue plastic bag 
emblazoned with a picture of an American-style cowboy she pulled her most unexpected 
acquisition: a stack of five aluminum cooking pots bound together with plastic wrap.  These 
were a familiar sight from my forays to the market in town, where vendors lined up nesting 
cookware like gleaming sets of matryoshka dolls.  Musonda and I watched while her mother 
stood on her toes to reach over the too-big table to the shelves where the family’s sundry 
kitchen equipment was kept.  The pots we used every day were arranged neatly on the top 
shelf, and Mrs. Mwanza pulled them down before unwrapping her new cookware and lining it 
up in place of the old.   
 
As she busied herself with this task, Mrs. Mwanza explained that she and her fellow teachers 
had taken their students on a fieldtrip that day, and that each of them had been given some 
money for food and other expenses.  None of them had used it all.  So, she went on, as soon as 
they returned the children to school at the end of the day all the teachers went straight to 
town, extra cash in hand.  One of her coworkers, who was also the wife of a Pentecostal 
pastor, had bought a set of cookware, saying as she did that doing so was ‘better than eating’ 
the money (chawama ukuchila ukulya).  This argument sounded compelling to Mrs. Mwanza, 
who followed her friend’s example and bought a set of pots as well.   
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Mrs. Mwanza carefully arranged the five new pots from largest to smallest along the top shelf, 
turning them so their handles each pointed in the same straight angle towards the window 
above the sink.  In the flickering candlelight we admired their shine, which Mrs. Mwanza 
contrasted to the dented and smudged surfaces of her old cookware.  Because no one could 
enter the house without passing through the kitchen, Mrs. Mwanza felt sure that everyone 
who came to visit had seen her dingy pots lined up on the shelf.  This she found deeply 
embarrassing, and especially inappropriate for a pastor’s home, as they belied the Pentecostal 
message of divine provision and prosperity.  In contrast, the new pots would reinforce this 
idea.  At least now, Mrs. Mwanza noted with a sigh of contentment, everyone who called on 
the pastor would see that he and his family were ‘living well’ (ukwikala bwino). 
 
Prosperity, Consumption, and Elective Affinity 
 
The issue of material consumption among believers, represented by the story of Mrs. 
Mwanza’s new cookware, raises the question of the Pentecostal sociality better than almost 
anything else.  If previous discussions of the connection between this religion and capitalism 
have had little to say about the capacity of the former to forge social ties, they have been 
much clearer in their assertions that Pentecostalism is relationally corrosive.  Often, such 
arguments are based on preachers’ injunctions to ‘Make a complete break with the past’ 
(Meyer 1998) in order to find deliverance from the ‘spirit of poverty’ (Maxwell 1998).  In 
other words, through the message of the prosperity gospel and warnings about the spiritual 
danger of non-believing relatives, Pentecostalism simultaneously promotes individual 
material consumption and creates the possibility that accumulated wealth might be privately 
enjoyed rather than shared with others (de Boeck 2004: 108; Gifford 2004: 105ff).   
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Analyses linking Pentecostalism to the pursuit of personal gain through the breakdown of 
social relationships are problematic on at least two fronts.  First, the vast majority of these 
studies are based largely, if not exclusively, on sermons and interviews with church leaders.  
While these are certainly an important part of any anthropological discussion of Pentecostal 
ritual life, in the absence of a robust ethnographic engagement with those who spend their 
time listening to these messages it is impossible to determine the extent to which believers 
are putting their leaders’ words into practice (cf. Engelke 2010).  Secondly, the argument that 
Pentecostalism erodes relationships because it promotes and sanctions consumption is 
unsatisfying in its understanding of personal accumulation.  While the centrality of material 
wealth in the rhetoric of the prosperity gospel is obvious, it is a mistake to read consumption 
– even that of the individualized, capitalist variety that Pentecostalism is so often seen to 
promote – as automatically socially corrosive.  For, in places like Nsofu, personal 
accumulation is not simply about individual self-construction, but also about creating a 
particular kind of social world (Bloch and Parry 1989).  
 
As we have seen, social relationships on the Copperbelt are structured around economic 
inequality.  In Nsofu, as in other parts of Zambia (e.g. Pritchett 2001: 123-153), this material 
hierarchy is performed through the effective mobilization of wealth and consumer goods.  
Items like cookware or satellite dishes therefore serve as a language through which people 
establish their social position (see Sahlins 1976: 166ff; Ferguson 1999: 211-233).  In this 
context, the importance of displays of material goods, whether cooking pots, a television set, 
or an empty tin of Nescafe, is clear.  Such goods are given prominent positions in nearly every 
Copperbelt home, regardless of religious affiliation (cf. Hansen 1997: 158-160).  Given the 
ubiquity of these displays, we might ask what, if anything, the story of Mrs. Mwanza’s 
purchase shows us about Pentecostalism.  Responding to this question requires us to briefly 
24 
turn to Weber, for it is here that the connection to his study of the Protestant Ethic is most 
prominent.   
 
Like Copperbelt Pentecostals, early Protestants, at least in Weber’s treatment, viewed their 
material lives as indexes of their spiritual status.  In the case of European Calvinists, because 
faithful adherence to an earthly vocation served as a sign of divine election, capitalist 
investment and profit easily followed religious piety.  Similarly, for Pentecostals in urban 
Zambia, individual prosperity is understood not only as a sign of salvation, but also as an 
apologetic to non-believing relatives or neighbors.  Bana Karen, a member of Key of David 
Church, explained to me this way:   
 
NH: Are Christians supposed to prosper? 
BK: Definitely 
NH: Why? 
BK: We are entitled to.  That is ours, this very thing, this is God’s will…  that  
we prosper.  So in everything, we should prosper.  We should be 
prospering more than non-believers. 
NH:  …Why should you prosper more than non-believers? 
BK:  We [Pentecostals] must set an example.  They [non-believers] must see…  
maybe there is someone who is difficult, someone who has trouble 
coming quickly to Christ, you are telling them about God, so at least even 
before you even speak, they just see.  If they see – some people are 
difficult – but if they see, maybe they might be, one day they will ask 
you... maybe in the end they will become believers, just like that. 
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Because Pentecostalism on the Copperbelt imbues personal economic success with 
evangelistic value, the display of material goods carries special weight for believers in Nsofu.x  
I often heard Pastor Mwanza speak with a mixture of incredulity and distain of anyone who 
had wealth and did not show it; miserliness, it seemed, was something that this preacher 
could not condone, or even understand.  If in Pentecostalism believers are encouraged not 
only to pursue personal accumulation, as most previous analyses have agreed, but also to 
make those acquisitions visible, how do these religiously motivated economic actions fit into 
the wider material reality of the Copperbelt?  Specifically, what is the social role of display in 
this community?  The answer to these questions is found in the above discussion of exchange 
relationships between households of different material positions.   
 
When people are ranked by their financial status, and status is made visible through 
demonstrations of wealth, it is things like new cooking pots on the kitchen shelf that open the 
door for kin and neighbors to make specific material requests based on the evidence of 
another’s ability to respond (Guyer 2004: 147).  In other words, through the display of 
consumer goods, residents of Nsofu not only index their economic standing, but also signal 
their position as potential exchange partners to people of both higher and lower status.  The 
bonds formed by such exchanges between people of different material positions are, as we 
have seen, the stuff of Copperbelt social life.  Rather than marking an end to interpersonal 
relationships, then, conspicuous consumption in Nsofu lends itself much more readily to the 
formation of social ties through the relationship-building transactions that follow material 
inequality in this community.xi 
 
If we read the connection among display, exchange, and sociality in these terms, Mrs. 
Mwanza’s purchase of new cooking pots appears not simply as an instance of personalized, 
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late-capitalist consumption, but as an investment in a visible marker of status through which 
she and her family take their place in the community.  Her display facilitates – indeed, invites 
– exchange, and the enduring social relationships that follow from it.  With this perspective 
on the material accumulation of Pentecostals in mind, we are able to turn once more to how 
the religious practice of local believers involves them in the social life of their community.   
 
Conclusion: Pentecostal Inequality and Political Economy 
 
On the Zambian Copperbelt, Pentecostal practice promotes material inequality and display, 
and therefore serves to embed believers in social relationships.  As the example of Mrs. 
Mwanza’s pots illustrates, this happens partly through a Weberian process of elective affinity 
between the apologetic stance of Pentecostalism and the kinds of consumption and 
subsequent display that structure exchange relationships in Nsofu.  By encouraging them to 
make whatever wealth they have visible so that others will see that they are ‘staying well,’ 
preachers promote religious practices that establish believers in a visible hierarchy of wealth, 
which in turn creates social relationships by facilitating exchange.  The fact that evangelistic 
display is aimed at those outside the Pentecostal fold means that there is a strong possibility 
that enduring exchange relationships will develop between believers and their non-believing 
neighbors.  In this way, the material aspects of Copperbelt religious practice foster the 
integration of believers in social networks that extend beyond the boundaries of their 
religious cohort. 
 
In addition to promoting visible economic inequality through the display of consumer goods, 
Pentecostalism serves as a catalyst for social relationships in other ways.  Local definitions of 
prosperity, which reflect the cultural values of the Copperbelt by highlighting material 
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difference, also work to connect believers to financial networks that potentially reach outside 
the church.  Recall Mr. Moyo’s message to the members of Freedom Bible Church: success is 
not about everyone enjoying the lavish riches of the prosperity gospel, whether luxury cars or 
designer suits.  Instead, prosperity is defined in terms of an interdependent material 
hierarchy that allows everyone to advance his or her relative economic position, as when one 
person patronizes another’s business.  Here, believers were encouraged to participate in the 
market in ways that, like exchanges between households, reached across economic rank to 
form relationships that promote others’ wellbeing.   
 
Similarly, Mrs. Mwanza’s actions after buying new cookware indicate that this materially 
stratified notion of prosperity is also important to Pentecostal non-market, inter-household 
exchange.  After she had arranged her new pots in the kitchen, Mrs. Mwanza set most of her 
old cookware aside to pass along to Bana Ilunga and to the young wife of the church 
groundskeeper.  By giving out of her surplus Mrs. Mwanza enacted a hierarchical prosperity 
in which those in need benefited from those with a little extra.  All three women participated 
in this exchange relationship in a way that was simultaneously identifiable to them as a 
foretaste of their community’s salvation and an instance of the wider Copperbelt social 
reality. 
 
The examples of Pentecostalism on the Zambian Copperbelt provided in this paper have 
shown some of the direct and indirect ways in which this religion fosters believers’ 
integration in the economic and social life of their community.  In exploring this idea, my aim 
has been to expand our understanding of Pentecostal sociality in a particular urban setting.  
At the same time, by discussing how Nsofu believers are reconfiguring the idea of prosperity 
in the absence of the lavish wealth typically associated with the prosperity gospel, this paper 
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has also taken a step towards addressing the question of this religion’s staying power despite 
its failure to make good on its promises.  On the Zambian Copperbelt, Pentecostal ethics and 
neoliberal spirits meet in extant social and economic forms, but also create new networks.  In 
the light of numerous cultural settings in which Pentecostalism and neoliberalism have 
crossed paths, this connection will doubtless continue to be a valuable site for ethnographic 
engagement.   
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Notes: 
 
                                                        
i I carried out fieldwork on the Copperbelt during a preliminary trip from June-August 2006 and a long-term 
field project from February 2008 – July 2009. 
ii In 1996 the preamble to the newly amended Zambian constitution declared that  ‘the Republic [will be] a 
Christian nation while upholding the right of every person to enjoy that person's freedom of conscience or 
religion.’ 
iii When I asked my informants to help me find a Bemba equivalent for the English word ‘prosperity,’ they often 
found it difficult to translate.  The most common response to this query was the phrase, ‘ukuya pantanshi,’ (to go 
forward).   
iv In Zambia, as in most of southern Africa, teknonymy is routine; e.g. Bana Junior is ‘Junior’s’ mother. 
v Matthew 7:21.  The opening line of the song is, ‘No, it’s not everyone…’ (Awe, te bonse…) 
vi During my fieldwork workers employed by the mine on a contract basis earned K300,000 a month (about 
$60). 
vii In many ways, Nsofu was a microcosm of the rest of the country.  According to the Zambian Central Statistics 
office, in 2004 the mean monthly income for a Zambian household in 2004 was K 511, 377.   However, only 
about one in every three households (35 percent) had mean monthly incomes that exceeded K 300, 000; 
implying that the majority of Zambian households, or approximately 65 percent, had incomes that were 
insufficient to meet their basic needs. See: http://www.zamstats.gov.zm/lcm.php#02 for further statistics. 
Near the end of my fieldwork I administered an anonymous survey in nine Pentecostal congregations in 
and around Nsofu.  The total response was 389 people over age 15 (169 males, 220 females), most of them 
residents of the township.  Although these numbers are too small to constitute a statistically significant picture 
of the community, they indicate not only a wide range of economic diversity, but results that mirror those of the 
national survey.  Among the males, 43% reported monthly incomes below K250,000, while 66% of females 
reported incomes below this amount.  In 2006 the minimum wage in Zambia was set at a monthly salary of 
K268,000 (about $50 at the current exchange rate), which means that about half of the people in Nsofu were 
making less than that amount, and half more (in some cases, much more). 
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viii Often, the same household would occupy one side of an exchange relationship with one household and the 
other side with another; that is, while a family might be involved in one connection as a giver of material goods 
and recipient of intangible returns, it might be receiving material goods from another household whose financial 
situation was better still.  This was certainly the case of the Mwanza family.  In addition to the Mwanzas’ 
friendship with Bana Ilunga, near the end of my fieldwork they also became quite close to a family that had 
recently arrived in Nsofu.  The family was very well off and consistently contributed gifts to the Mwanza home, 
while the Mwanzas offered spiritual services in return. 
ix The dual relational ethic that I am describing in terms of ambition and obligation is evident throughout the 
Copperbelt ethnographic record.  Early analyses of urban Zambia consistently highlight the need to balance 
individual advancement against the needs and desires of one’s extended family (e.g. Wilson 1941; Mitchell 1957; 
Epstein 1961).  Similarly, in his more recent study of the Copperbelt, Ferguson (1999) identifies two Copperbelt 
‘styles’ that he describes as ‘localist’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ in orientation.  Here, the former could also be identified 
in terms of obligation to extended family, while the latter represent ambitions toward the wealth and prestige of 
the globalized economy.  
x Here we see a central difference between Weber’s Calvinists and Nsofu Pentecostals: while early Protestants in 
Northern Europe sought to set themselves apart by their labor, thereby confirming their status among the elect, 
Copperbelt believers are involved in religiously motivated economic activities designed to promote 
relationships with those outside their religious cohort.   
xi This is not to say that there are not members of the community who accumulate wealth without participating 
in the kinds of cross-class relationships that I have described in Nsofu.  However, this is socially risky behavior, 
as a refusal to engage in this kind of sociality opens a person up to accusations of witchcraft or Satanism.   
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